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PART 1
Empirical 





In this study we develop a theoretical model for ultimate 
loss-given default in the Merton (1974) structural credit risk 
model  framework,  deriving  compound  option  formulae  to 
model differential seniority of instruments, and incorporating 
an optimal foreclosure threshold. We consider an extension 
that allows for an independent recovery rate process, rep-
resenting undiversifiable recovery risk, having a stochastic 
drift. The comparative statics of this model are analyzed and 
compared and in the empirical exercise, we calibrate the 
models to observed LGDs on bonds and loans having both 
trading prices at default and at resolution of default, utilizing 
an extensive sample of losses on defaulted firms (Moody’s 
Ultimate Recovery Database™), 800 defaults in the period 
1987-2008 that are largely representative of the U.S. large 
corporate loss experience, for which we have the complete 
capital structures and can track the recoveries on all instru-
ments from the time of default to the time of resolution. We 
find that parameter estimates vary significantly across re-
covery segments, that the estimated volatilities of recovery 
rates and of their drifts are increasing in seniority (bank loans 
versus bonds). We also find that the component of total re-
covery volatility attributable to the LGD-side (as opposed to 
the PD-side) systematic factor is greater for higher ranked 
instruments and that more senior instruments have lower 
default risk, higher recovery rate return and volatility, as well 
as greater correlation between PD and LGD. Analyzing the 
implications of our model for the quantification of downturn 
LGD, we find the ratio of the later to ELGD (the “LGD mark-
up”) to be declining in expected LGD, but uniformly higher 
for lower ranked instruments or for higher PD-LGD corre-
lation.  Finally,  we  validate  the  model  in  an  out-of-sample 
bootstrap exercise, comparing it to a high-dimensional re-
gression model and to a non-parametric benchmark based 
upon the same data, where we find our model to compare 
favorably. We conclude that our model is worthy of consid-
eration to risk managers, as well as supervisors concerned 
with advanced IRB under the Basel II capital accord.
Michael Jacobs, Jr. — Senior Financial Economist, Credit Risk Analysis Division, Department of 
Economic and International Affairs, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency1 
1  The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not neces-
sarily represent a position taken by of the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency or the U.S. Department of the Treasury.32
Loss given default (LGD)2, the loss severity on defaulted obligations, is 
a critical component of risk management, pricing and portfolio models 
of credit. This is among the three primary determinants of credit risk, 
the other two being the probability of default (PD) and exposure of de-
fault (EAD). However, LGD has not been as extensively studied, and is 
considered a much more daunting modeling challenge in comparison to 
other components, such as PD. Starting with the seminal work by Altman 
(1968), and after many years of actuarial tabulation by rating agencies, 
predictive modeling of default rates is currently in a mature stage. The fo-
cus on PD is understandable, as traditionally credit models have focused 
on systematic components of credit risk which attract risk premia, and 
unlike PD determinants of LGD have been ascribed to idiosyncratic bor-
rower specific factors. However, now there is an ongoing debate about 
whether the risk premium on defaulted debt should reflect systematic 
risk, in particular whether the intuition that LGDs should rise in worse 
states of the world is correct, and how this could be refuted empirically 
given limited and noisy data [Carey and Gordy (2007)]. The recent height-
ened focus on LGD is evidenced the flurry of research into this relatively 
neglected area [Acharya et al. (2007), Carey and Gordy (2007), Altman et 
al. (2001, 2003, 2004), Altman (2006), Gupton et al. (2000, 2005), Araten 
et al. (2003), Frye (2000 a,b,c, 2003), Jarrow (2001)]. This has been mo-
tivated by the large number of defaults and near simultaneous decline in 
recovery values observed at the trough of the last two credit cycle circa 
2000-2002 and 2008-2009, regulatory developments such as Basel II 
[BIS (2003, 2005, 2006), OCC et al. (2007)], and the growth in credit mar-
kets. However, obstacles to better understanding and predicting LGD, 
including dearth of data and the lack of a coherent theoretical underpin-
ning, have continued to challenge researchers. In this paper, we hope to 
contribute to this effort by synthesizing advances in financial theory to 
build a model of LGD that is consistent with a priori expectations and 
stylized facts, internally consistent and amenable to rigorous validation. 
In addition to answering the many questions that academics have, we 
further aim to provide a practical tool for risk managers, traders, and 
regulators in the field of credit.
LGD may be defined variously depending upon the institutional setting or 
modeling context, or the type of instrument (traded bonds versus bank 
loans) versus the credit risk model (pricing debt instruments subject to the 
risk of default versus expected losses or credit risk capital). In the case of 
bonds, one may look at the price of traded debt at either the initial credit 
event3, the market values of instruments received at the resolution of dis-
tress4 [Keisman et al. (2000), Altman and Kishore (1996)], or the actual 
cash-flows incurred during a workout.5 When looking at loans that may 
not be traded, the eventual loss per dollar of outstanding balance at de-
fault is relevant [Asarnow and Edwards (1995), Araten et al. (2003)]. There 
are two ways to measure the latter – the accounting LGD refers to nominal 
loss per dollar outstanding at default,6 while the economic LGD refers to 
the discounted cash flows to the time of default taking into consideration 
when cash was received. The former is used in setting reserves or a loan 
loss allowance, while the latter is an input into a credit capital attribution 
and allocation model. In this study we develop various theoretical mod-
els for ultimate loss-given default in the Merton (1974) structural credit 
risk model framework. We consider an extension that allows for differ-
ential seniority within the capital structure, an independent recovery rate 
process, representing undiversifiable recovery risk, with stochastic drift. 
The comparative statics of this model are analyzed in a framework that 
incorporates an optimal foreclosure threshold [Carey and Gordy (2007)]. 
In the empirical exercise, we calibrate alternative models for ultimate LGD 
on bonds and loans having both trading prices at default and at resolu-
tion of default, utilize an extensive sample of rated defaulted firms in the 
period 1987-2008 (Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database™ - URD™), 800 
defaults (bankruptcies and out-of-court settlements of distress) that are 
largely representative of the U.S. large corporate loss experience, for which 
we have the complete capital structures and can track the recoveries on 
all instruments to the time of default to the time of resolution. We find that 
parameter estimates vary significantly across recovery segments. We find 
that the estimated volatilities of the recovery rate processes, as well as of 
their random drifts are increasing in seniority, in particular for bank loans 
as compared to bonds. We interpret this as reflecting greater risk in the 
ultimate recovery for higher ranked instruments having lower expected 
loss severities (or ELGDs). Analyzing the implications of our model for 
the quantification of downturn LGD, we find the later to be declining in 
expected LGD, higher for worse ranked instruments, increasing in the 
correlation between the processes driving firm default and recovery on 
collateral, and increasing in the volatility of the systematic factor specific 
to the recovery rate process or the volatility of the drift in such. Finally, we 
validate the leading model derived herein in an out-of-sample bootstrap 
exercise, comparing it to a high-dimensional regression model, and to a 
non-parametric benchmark based upon the same data, where we find 
our model to compare favorably. We conclude that our model is worthy 
of consideration to risk managers, as well as supervisors concerned with 
advanced IRB under the Basel II capital accord.
2  This is equivalent to one minus the recovery rate, or dollar recovery as a proportion of 
par, or EAD assuming all debt becomes due at default. We will speak in terms of LGD as 
opposed to recoveries with a view toward credit risk management applications.
3  By default we mean either bankruptcy (Chapter 11) or other financial distress (payment 
default). In a banking context, this is defined as being synonymous with respect to non-
accrual on a discretionary or non-discretionary basis. This is akin to the notion of default in 
Basel, but only proximate.
4  Note that this may be either the value of pre-petition instruments received valued at emer-
gence from bankruptcy, or the market values of new securities received in settlement of a 
bankruptcy proceeding, or as the result of a distressed restructuring.
5  Note that the former may be viewed as a proxy to this, the pure economic notion.
6  In the context of bank loans, this is the cumulative net charge-off as a percent of book bal-
ance at default (the net charge-off rate).33
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Review of the literature
In this section we will examine the way in which different types of theo-
retical credit risk models have treated LGD – assumptions, implications 
for estimation and application. Credit risk modeling was revolutionized by 
the approach of Merton (1974), who built a theoretical model in the option 
pricing paradigm of Black and Scholes (1973), which has come known 
to be the structural approach. Equity is modeled as a call option on the 
value of the firm, with the face value of zero coupon debt serving as 
the strike price, which is equivalent to shareholders buying a put option 
on the firm from creditors with this strike price. Given this capital struc-
ture, log-normal dynamics of the firm value and the absence of arbitrage, 
closed form solutions for the default probability and the spread on debt 
subject to default risk can be derived. The LGD can be shown to depend 
upon the parameters of the firm value process as is the PD, and more-
over is directly related to the latter, in that the expected residual value to 
claimants is increasing (decreasing) in firm value (asset volatility or the 
level of indebtedness). Consequently, LGD is not independently modeled 
in this framework; this was addressed in much more recent versions of 
the structural framework [Frye (2000), Dev and Pykhtin (2002), Pykhtin 
(2003)]. Extensions of Merton (1974) relaxed many of the simplifying as-
sumptions of the initial structural approach. Complexity to the capital 
structure was added by Black and Cox (1976) and Geske (1977), with 
subordinated and interest paying debt, respectively. The distinction be-
tween long- and short-term liabilities in Vasicek (1984) was the precursor 
to the KMVä model. However, these models had limited practical appli-
cability, the standard example being evidence of Jones et al. (1984) that 
these models were unable to price investment grade debt any better than 
a naïve model with no default risk. Further, empirical evidence in Franks 
and Touros (1989) showed that the adherence to absolute priority rules 
(APR) assumed by these models are often violated in practice, which im-
plies that the mechanical negative relationship between expected asset 
value and LGD may not hold. Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) incorporate 
into this framework a stochastic term structure with a PD-interest rate 
correlation. Other extensions include Kim at al. (1993) and Hull and White 
(2002), who examine the effect of coupons and the influence of options 
markets, respectively.
Partly in response to this, a series of extensions ensued, the so-called 
‘second generation’ of structural form credit risk models [Altman (2003)]. 
The distinguishing characteristic of this class of models is the relaxation of 
the assumption that default can only occur at the maturity of debt  – now 
default occurs at any point between debt issuance and maturity when the 
firm value process hits a threshold level. The implication is that LGD is 
exogenous relative to the asset value process, defined by a fixed (or ex-
ogenous stochastic) fraction of outstanding debt value. This approach can 
be traced to the barrier option framework as applied to risky debt of Black 
and Cox (1976). All structural models suffer from several common defi-
ciencies. First, reliance upon an unobservable asset value process makes 
calibration to market prices problematic, inviting model risk. Second, the 
limitation of assuming a continuous diffusion for the state process implies 
that the time of default is perfectly predictable [Duffie and Lando (2001)]. 
Finally, the inability to model spread or downgrade risk distorts the mea-
surement of credit risk. This gave rise to the reduced form approach to 
credit risk modeling [Duffie and Singleton (1999)], which instead of condi-
tioning on the dynamics of the firm, posit exogenous stochastic processes 
for PD and LGD. These models include (to name a few) Litterman and 
Iben (1991), Madan and Unal (1995), Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), Lando 
(1998), and Duffie (1998). The primitives determining the price of credit 
risk are the term structure of interest rates (or short rate), and a default 
intensity and an LGD process. The latter may be correlated with PD, but it 
is exogenously specified, with the link of either of these to the asset value 
(or latent state process) not formally specified. However, the available em-
pirical evidence [Duffie and Singleton (1999)] has revealed these models 
deficient in generating realistic term structures of credit spreads for invest-
ment and speculative grade bonds simultaneously. A hybrid reduced -   
structural form approach of Zhou (2001), which models firm value as a 
jump diffusion process, has had more empirical success, especially in gen-
erating a realistic negative relationship between LGD and PD [Altman et al. 
(2006)]. The fundamental difference of reduced with structural form models 
is the unpredictability of defaults: PD is non-zero over any finite time inter-
val, and the default intensity is typically a jump process (e.g., Poisson), so 
that default cannot be foretold given information available the instant prior. 
However, these models can differ in how LGD is treated. The recovery of 
treasury assumption of Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) assumes that an exog-
enous fraction of an otherwise equivalent default-free bond is recovered 
at default. Duffie and Singleton (1999) introduce the recovery of market 
value assumption, which replaces the default-free bond by a defaultable 
bond of identical characteristics to the bond that defaulted, so that LGD is 
a stochastically varying fraction of market value of such bond the instant 
before default. This model yields closed form expressions for defaultable 
bond prices and can accommodate the correlation between PD and LGD; 
in particular, these stochastic parameters can be made to depend on com-
mon systematic or firm specific factors. Finally, the recovery of face value 
assumption [Duffie (1998), Jarrow et al. (1997)] assumes that LGD is a fixed 
(or seniority specific) fraction of par, which allows the use of rating agency 
estimates of LGD and transition matrices to price risky bonds.
It is worth mentioning the treatment of LGD in credit models that attempt 
to quantify unexpected losses analogously to the Value-at-Risk (VaR) mar-
ket risk models, so-called credit VaR models – Creditmetrics™ [Gupton 
et al. (1997)], KMV CreditPortfolioManager™ [KMV Corporation (1984)], 
CreditRisk+™ [Credit Suisse Financial Products (1997)], and CreditPort-
folioView™ [Wilson (1998)]. These models are widely employed by finan-
cial institutions to determine expected credit losses as well as economic 
capital (or unexpected losses) on credit portfolios. The main output of 
these models is a probability distribution function for future credit losses 34
over some given horizon, typically generated by simulation of analyti-
cal approximations, as it is modeled as highly non-normal (asymmetrical 
and fat-tailed). Characteristics of the credit portfolio serving as inputs are 
LGDs, PDs, EADs, default correlations, and rating transition probabilities. 
Such models can incorporate credit migrations (mark-to-market mode 
– MTM), or consider the binary default versus survival scenario (default 
mode – DM), the principle difference being that in addition an estimated 
transition matrix needs to be supplied in the former case. Similar to the 
reduced form models of single name default, LGD is exogenous, but po-
tentially stochastic. While the marketed vendor models may treat LGD as 
stochastic (e.g., a draw from a beta distribution that is parameterized by 
expected moments of LGD), there are some more elaborate proprietary 
models that can allow LGD to be correlated with PD.
We conclude our discussion of theoretical credit risk models and the 
treatment of LGD by considering recent approaches, which are capable 
of capturing more realistic dynamics, sometimes called ‘hybrid models.’ 
These include Frye (2000a, 2000b), Jarrow (2001), Bakshi et al. (2001), 
Jokivuolle et al. (2003), Pykhtin (2003), and Carey and Gordy (2007). Such 
models are motivated by the conditional approach to credit risk model-
ing, credited to Finger (1999) and Gordy (2000), in which a single sys-
tematic factor derives defaults. In this more general setting, they share in 
common the feature that dependence upon a set of systematic factors 
can induce an endogenous correlation between PD & LGD. In the model 
of Frye (2000a, 2000b), the mechanism that induces this dependence is 
the influence of systematic factors upon the value of loan collateral, lead-
ing to lower recoveries (and higher loss severity) in periods where default 
rates rise (since asset values of obligors also depend upon the same 
factors). In a reduced form setting, Jarrow (2001) introduced a model of 
codependent LGD and PD implicit in debt and equity prices.7
Theoretical model
The model that we propose is an extension of Black and Cox (1976). The 
baseline mode features perpetual corporate debt, a continuous and a 
positive foreclosure boundary. The former assumption removes the time 
dependence of the value of debt, thereby simplifying the solution and 
comparative statics. The latter assumption allows us to study the endog-
enous determination of the foreclosure boundary by the bank, as in Carey 
and Gordy (2007). We extend the latter model by allowing the coupon 
on the loan to follow a stochastic process, accounting for the effect of 
illiquidity. Note that in this framework, we assume no restriction on as-
set sales, so that we do not consider strategic bankruptcy, as in Leland 
(1994) and Leland and Toft (1996).
Let us assume a firm financed by equity and debt, normalized such that 
the total value of perpetual debt is 1, divided such that there is a single 
loan with face value λ and a single class of bonds with a face value of 
1- λ. The loan is senior to that bond, and potentially has covenants which 
permit foreclosure. The loan is entitled to a continuous coupon at a rate 
c, which in the baseline model we take as a constant, but may evolve 
randomly. Equity receives a continuous dividend, having a constant and 
a variable component, which we denote as δ + ρVt, where Vt is the value 
of the firm’s assets at time t. We impose the restriction that 0<ρ<r<c, 
where r is the constant risk-free rate. The asset value of the firm, net 
of coupons and dividends, follows a Geometric Brownian Motion with 
constant volatility s: dVt/Vt = (r – ρ – C/Vt)dt + sdZt (3.1), where in (3.1) 
we denote the fixed cash outflows per unit time as: C = cλ + γ (1 – λ) + δ 
(3.2), where in (3.2) γ and δ are the continuous coupon rate on the bond 
and dividend yield on equity, respectively. Default occurs at time t and is 
resolved after a fixed interval τ, at which point dividend payments cease, 
but the loan coupon continues to accrue through the settlement period. 
At the point of emergence, loan holders receive (λ exp(cτ), Vt+τ)-, or the 
minimum of the legal claim or the value of the firm at emergence. We can 
value the loan at resolution, under either physical or risk neutral measure, 
using the standard Merton (1974) formula. Denote the total legal claim at 
default by: D = λ exp(cτ) + (1- λ) (3.5). This follows from the assumption 
that the coupon c on the loan with face value λ continues to accrue at 
the contractual rate throughout the resolution period τ, whereas the bond 
with face value 1- λ does not. 
Thus far we have taken the solved for LGD under the assumption that 
the senior bank creditors foreclose on the bank when the value of assets 
is Vt, where t is the time of default. However, this is not realistic, as firm 
value fluctuates throughout the bankruptcy or workout period, and we 
can think that there will be some foreclosure boundary (denoted by κ) 
below which foreclosure is effectuated. Furthermore, in most cases there 
exists a covenant boundary, above which foreclosure cannot occur, but 
below which it may occur as the borrower is in violation of a contractual 
provision. For the time being, let us ignore the latter complication, and 
focus on the optimal choice of κ by the bank. In the general case of 
time dependency in the loan valuation equation F(Vt | λ, s, r, τ), following 
Black and Cox (1976), we have to solve a following second order partial 
differential equation. Following Carey and Gordy (2007), we modify this 
such that the value of the loan at the threshold is not a constant, but 
simply equal to the recovery value of the loan at the default time. Second, 
we remove the time dependency in the value of the perpetual debt. It is 
shown in Carey and Gordy (2007) that under these assumptions, so long 
as there are positive and fixed cash flows to claimants other than the 
bank, γ(1-λ) > 0 or δ > 0, then there exists a finite and positive solution 
κ*, the optimal foreclosure boundary (and the solution reduces to a 2nd 
order ordinary differential equation, which can be solved using standard 
numerical techniques.)
7  Jarrow (2001) also has the advantage of isolating the liquidity premium embedded in 
defaultable bond spreads.35
We model undiversifiable recovery risk by introducing a separate process 
for recovery on debt, Rt. This can be interpreted as the state of collateral 
underlying the loan or bond. Rt is a geometric Brownian process that de-
pends upon the Brownian motion that drives the return on the firm’s as-
sets Zt, an independent Brownian motion Wt and a random instantaneous 
mean at: dRt/Rt = atdt + βdZt + υdWt (3.6); dat = κa(a ¯ – at)dt + ηdBt (3.7). 
Where the volatility parameter β represents the sensitivity of recovery to 
the source of uncertainty driving asset returns (or the systematic factor), 
implying that the instantaneous correlation between asset returns and re-
covery is given by 1/dt Corrt (dAt/At x dRt/Rt) =  . On the other hand, 
the volatility parameter υ represents the sensitivity of recovery to a source 
of uncertainty that is particular to the return on collateral, also considered 
a ‘systematic factor,’ but independent of the asset return process. The 
third source of recovery uncertainty is given by (3.7), where we model 
the instantaneous drift on the recovery rate by an Orhnstein-Uhlenbeck 
mean-reverting process, with κa the speed of mean-reversion, a ¯ the long-
run mean, η the constant diffusion term, and Bt is a standard Weiner pro-
cess having instantaneous correlation with the source of randomness in 
the recovery process, given heuristically by ς = 1/dt Corrt (dBt/dWt). The 
motivation behind this specification is the overwhelming evidence that the 
mean LGD is stochastic.
Economic LGD on the loan is given by following expectation under physi-
cal measure:
(3.8)
Where the modified option theoretic function B(·) is given by:
(3.9)
having arguments to the Gaussian distribution function
:
(3.10)
A well-known result [Bjerksund (1991)] is that the maturity-dependent 
volatilityis given by:
(3.11)
The recovery to the bondholders is the expectation of the minimum of the 
positive part of the difference in the recovery and face value of the loan 
[Rt+τ – λexp(cτ)]+ and the face value of the bond B, which is structurally 
identical to a compound option valuation problem [Geske (1977)]:
(3.12)
where Rt+τ = Rt exp [at – ((β2 + v2)/2) τλ + βZt+ τλ + vWt+, τλ] is the value 
of recovery on the collateral at the time of resolution. We can easily write 
down the closed-form solution for the LGD on the bond according to the 
well-known formula for a compound option: here the ‘outer option’ is a 
put, and the ‘inner option’ is a call, and the expiry dates are equal. Let 
R* be the critical level of recovery such that the holder of the loan is just 
breaking even:
()
* exp1 ,| ,, ,, ,,,
P
t cL GD Rc = ( ) (3.13)
where τλ is the time-to-resolution for the loan, which we assume to be 
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(3.16)
(3.17)
Where  Φ2  (X,  Y;  ρXY)  is  the  bivariate  normal  distribution  function  for 
Brownian increments the correlation parameter is given by ρXY = (TX/
TY)1/2 for respective ‘expiry times’ TX and TY for X and Y, respectively. 
Note that this assumption, which is realistic in that we observe in the data 
that on average earlier default on the bond even if it emerges from bank-
ruptcy or resolve a default at a single time (which in addition is random), 
is matter of necessity in the log-normal setting in that the bivariate normal 
distribution is not defined for ρXY = (τ/τ) = 1 in the case that TX = TY = 
τ. We can extend this framework to arbitrary tranches of debt, such as 
for a subordinated issue, in which case we follow the same procedure in 
order to arrive at an expression that involves trivariate cumulative normal 
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distributions. In general, a debt issue that is subordinated to the dth de-
gree results in a pricing formula that is a linear combination of d+1 vari-
ate Gaussian distributions. These formulae become cumbersome very 
quickly, so for the sake of brevity we refer the interested reader to Haug 
(2006) for further details.
Comparative statics
In this section we discuss and analyze the sensitivity of ultimate LGD in 
to various key parameters. In Figures 1 and 2 we examine the sensitivity 
of the ultimate LGD in the 2-factor model mentioned above, incorporat-
ing the optimal foreclosure boundary. In Figure 1, we show the ultimate 
LGD as a function of the volatility in the recovery rate process attribut-
able to the LGD side systematic factor η, fixing firm value at default at 
Vt = 0.5. We observe that ultimate LGD increases at an increasing rate in 
this parameter, that for higher correlation between firm asset value and 
recovery value return the LGD is higher and increases at a faster rate, 
and that for bonds these curves lie above and increase at a faster rate. In 
Figure 2 we show the ultimate LGD as a function of the volatility β in the 
recovery rate process attributable to the PD side systematic factor, fixing 
LGD side volatility υ = 0.5, for different firm values at default at Vt = (0.3, 
0.5, 0.8). We observe that ultimate LGD increases at an increasing rate 
in this parameter, that for lower firm asset values the LGD is higher but 
increases at a slower rate, and that for bonds these curves lie above and 
increase at a lower rate.
Empirical analysis – calibration of models
In this section we describe our strategy for estimating parameters of the 
models for ultimate LGD by full-information maximum likelihood (FIML.) 
This involves a consideration of the LGD implied in the market at time of 
default tD
i for the ith instrument in recovery segment s, denoted LGDi,s,tiD. 
This is the expected, discounted ultimate loss-given-default LGDi,s,tiE at 
time of emergence tE
i as given by any of our models m, LGDP
s,m (θs,m) 




Where θs,m is the parameter vector for segment s under model m, ex-
pectation is taken with respect to physical measure P, discounting is at 
risk adjusted rate appropriate to the instrument rD
i,s and it is assumed 
that the time-to-resolution tE
i,s – tD
i,s is known. In order to account for the 
fact that we cannot observe expected recovery prices ex-ante, as only 
by coincidence would they coincide with expectations, we invoke market 
rationality to postulate that for a segment homogenous with respect to 
recovery risk the difference between expected and average realized re-
coveries should be small. We formulate this by defining the normalized 
forecast error as:
(4.2)
This is the forecast error as a proportion of the LGD implied by the market 
at default (a ‘unit-free’ measure of recovery uncertainty) and the square 
root of the time-to-resolution. This is a mechanism to control for the likely 
increase  in  uncertainty  with  time-to-resolution,  which  effectively  puts 
more weight on longer resolutions, increasing the estimate of the loss-
severity. The idea behind this is that more information is revealed as the 
emergence point is approached, hence a decrease in risk. Alternatively, 
we can analyze εi,s ≡ [LGDP
s,m (θs,m) – LGDi,s,tiE] ÷ LGDi,s,tiD, the fore-
cast error that is non-time adjusted, and argue that its standard error 

















































Y-Axis: Ultimate LGD in optimal foreclosure boundary stochastic collateral and Drift Merton 
Model
X-Axis: Sensitivity of recovery process to LGD side systematic (“η”)
Figure 1 – Ultimate loss-give-default versus sensitivity of recovery 
process to LGD side systematic factor

















































Y-Axis: Ultimate LGD in optimal foreclosure boundary stochastic collateral and Drift Merton 
Model
X-Axis: Sensitivity of recovery process to PD side systematic factor (“β”)
Figure 2 – Ultimate loss-given-default versus sensitivity of recovery 
process to PD side systematic factor37
is proportional to (tE
i,s – tD
i,s)1/2, which is consistent with an economy in 
which information is revealed uniformly and independently through time 
[Miu and Ozdemir (2005)]. Assuming that the errors ε ˜i,s in (4.2) are stan-
dard normal,8 we may use full-information maximum likelihood (FIML), by 
maximizing the log-likelihood (LL) function:
(4.3)
This turns out to be equivalent to minimizing the squared normalized 
forecast errors:
(4.4)
We  may  derive  a  measure  of  uncertainty  of  our  estimate  by  the  ML 
8  If the errors are i.i.d and from symmetric distributions, then we can still obtain consistent 
estimates through ML, which has the interpretations as the quasi-ML estimator.
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  Bankruptcy Out-of-court Total
Count  Average 
Standard error 
of the mean Count  Average 
Standard error 
of the mean Count  Average 
Standard error 
of the mean









2 55.97% 0.96% 38.98% 3.29% 55.08% 0.93%
Discounted LGD
3 51.43% 1.15% 33.89% 3.05% 50.52% 1.10%
Time-to-resolution
4 1.7263 0.0433 0.0665 0.0333 1.6398 0.0425
Principal at default
5 207,581 9,043 416,751 65,675 218,493 9,323









2 57.03% 1.97% 37.02% 5.40% 55.96% 1.88%
Discounted LGD
3 52.44% 1.30% 30.96% 3.00% 51.30% 1.25%
Time-to-resolution
4 1.8274 0.0486 0.0828 0.0415 1.7346 0.0424
Principal at default
5 214,893 11,148 432,061 72,727 226,439 11,347









2 54.37% 1.96% 33.35% 8.10% 53.03% 1.93%
Discounted LGD
3 52.03% 2.31% 33.33% 7.63% 50.84% 2.23%
Time-to-resolution
4 1.4089 0.0798 0.0027 0.0000 1.3194 0.0776
Principal at default
5 205,028 19,378 246,163 78,208 207,647 18,786









2 53.31% 9.90% 38.86% 7.22% 52.50% 3.21%
Discounted LGD
3 50.00% 1.68% 38.31% 5.79% 49.34% 2.25%
Time-to-resolution
4 1.3884 0.0605 0.0027 0.0000 1.3102 0.0816
Principal at default
5 193,647 11,336 291,939 78,628 199,192 16,088









2 55.66% 0.86% 37.72% 3.12% 54.69% 0.84%
Discounted LGD
3 51.55% 1.03% 33.76% 2.89% 50.58% 0.99%
Time-to-resolution
4 1.6663 0.0384 0.0522 0.0260 1.5786 0.0376
Principal at default
5 207,099 8,194 378,593 54,302 216,422 8,351
1 –   Annualized return or yield on defaulted debt from the date of default (bankruptcy filing or distressed renegotiation date) to the date of resolution (settlement of renegotiation or emergence from 
Chapter 11).
2 – Par minus the price of defaulted debt at the time of default (average 30-45 days after default) as a percent of par.
3 –   The ultimate dollar loss-given-default on the defaulted debt instrument = 1 – (total recovery at emergence from bankruptcy or time of final settlement)/(outstanding at default). Alternatively, this 
can be expressed as (outstanding at default – total ultimate loss)/(outstanding at default)
4 – The total instrument outstanding at default.
5 – The time in years from the instrument default date to the time of ultimate recovery.
Table 1 – Characteristics of loss-given-default and return on defaulted debt observations by default and instrument type  
(Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database 1987-2009)38
standard errors from the Hessian matrix evaluated at the optimum:
(4.5)
Data and estimation results
We summarize basic characteristics of our dataset in Table 1 and the 
maximum likelihood estimates are shown in Table 2. These are based 
upon our analysis of defaulted bonds and loans in the Moody’s Ultimate 
Recovery (MURD™) database release as of August, 2009. This contains 
the market values of defaulted instruments at or near the time of default9, 
as well as the values of such pre-petition instruments (or of instruments 
received in settlement) at the time of default resolution. This database is 
largely representative of the U.S. large-corporate loss experience, from 
the mid 1980s to the present, including most of the major corporate 
bankruptcies occurring in this period. Table 1 shows summary statistics 
of various quantities of interest according to instrument type (bank loan, 
bond, term loan, or revolver) and default type (bankruptcy under Chapter 
11 or out-of-court renegotiation). First, we annualized the return or yield 
on defaulted debt from the date of default (bankruptcy filing or distressed 
renegotiation date) to the date of resolution (settlement of renegotiation 
or emergence from Chapter 11), henceforth abbreviated as ‘RDD.’ Sec-
ond, the trading price at default implied LGD (‘TLGD’), or par minus the 
trading price of defaulted debt at the time of default (average 30-45 days 
after default) as a percent of par value. Third, our measure of ultimate loss 
Recovery segment Parameter s 
(1) μ 
(2) β 






























credit / term 
loan
Est. 4.32% 18.63% 18.16% 36.83% 41.06% 19.55% 80.45% 12.82% 3.96% 37.08% 48.85% 20.88%




Est. 5.47% 16.99% 16.54% 30.41% 34.62% 22.83% 77.17% 11.64% 4.40% 33.66% 44.43% 18.99%




Est. 6.82% 14.16% 13.82% 24.38% 28.02% 24.30% 75.70% 9.71% 5.50% 28.07% 37.04% 15.83%




Est. 8.19% 11.33% 12.02% 17.35% 21.11% 32.43% 67.57% 7.76% 4.42% 22.45% 29.68% 12.69%
Std. Err. 0.6216% 1.0087% 1.0482% 1.0389%       0.9775% 0.0181% 2.0056% 2.0132% 1.0016%
Subordinated 
bonds
Est. 9.05% 9.60% 10.24% 12.37% 16.06% 40.66% 59.34% 5.97% 3.34% 18.80% 18.69% 9.43%
Std. Err. 0.6192% 1.0721% 1.0128% 1.0771%       0.9142% 0.0106% 2.049% 2.0014% 1.0142%
Value log-likelihood function -371.09
Degrees of freedom 1391
















































1 – The volatility of the firm-value process governing default.
2 – The drift of the firm-value process governing default.
3 – The sensitivity of the recovery-rate process to the systematic governing default in (or the component of volatility in the recovery process due to PD-side systematic risk).
4 – The sensitivity of the recovery-rate process to the systematic governing collateral value (or the component of volatility in the recovery process due to LGD-side systematic risk).
5 – The total volatility of the recovery rate process: sqrt(β
2+ν
2)








8 – The speed of the mean-reversion in the random drift in the recovery rate process.
9 – The long-run mean of the random drift in the recovery arte process.
10 – The volatility of the random drift in the recovery rate process.
11 – The correlation of the random processes in drift of and the level of the recovery rate process.
Table 2 – Full information maximum likelihood estimation of option theoretic two-factor structural model of ultimate loss-given-default with optimal 
foreclosure boundary, systematic recovery risk and random drift in the recovery process (Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database 1987-2009)
9  This is an average of trading prices from 30 to 45 days following the default event. A set of 
dealers is polled every day and the minimum/maximum quote is thrown out. This is done by 
experts at Moody’s.39
severity, the dollar loss-given-default on the debt instrument at emer-
gence from bankruptcy or time of final settlement (ULGD), computed as 
par minus either values of pre-petition or settlement instruments at reso-
lution. We also summarize two additional variables in Table 1, the total 
instrument outstanding at default, and the time in years from the instru-
ment default date to the time of ultimate recovery. The preponderance 
of this sample is made up of bankruptcies as opposed to out-of-court 
settlements, 1322 out of a total of 1398 instruments. We note that out-
of-court settlements have lower LGDs by either the trading or ultimate 
measures, 37.7% and 33.8%, as compared to Chapter 11’s, 55.7% and 
51.6%, respectively; and the heavy weight of bankruptcies are reflected 
in how close the latter are to the overall averages, 54.7% and 50.6% 
for TLGD and ULGD, respectively. Interestingly, not only do distressed 
renegotiations have lower loss severities, but such debt performs better 
over the default period than bankruptcies, RDD of 37.3% as compared to 
28.1%, as compared to an overall RDD of 28.6%. We also note that the 
TLGD is higher than the ULGD by around 5% across default and instru-
ment types, 55.7% (37.7%) as compared to 51.6% (33.8%) for bankrupt-
cies (renegotiations). Finally, we find that loans have better recoveries 
by both measures as well higher returns on defaulted debt, respective 
average TLGD, ULGD and RDD are 52.5%, 49.35% and 32.2%.
In Table 2 we present the full-information maximum likelihood estimation 
(FIML) results of the leading model for ultimate LGD derived in this paper, 
the two-factor structural model of ultimate loss-given-default, with sys-
tematic recovery risk and random drift (2FSM-SR&RD) on the recovery.10 
The model is estimated along with the optimal foreclosure boundary con-
straint. We first discuss the MLE point estimates of the parameters gov-
erning the firm value process and default risk, or the ‘PD-side.’ Regarding 
the parameter s, which is the volatility of the firm-value process govern-
ing default, we observe that estimates are decreasing in seniority class, 
ranging from 9.1% to 4.3% from subordinated bonds to senior loans, re-
spectively. As standard errors range in 1% to 2%, increasing in seniority 
rank, these differences across seniority classes and models are generally 
statistically significant. Regarding the MLE point estimates of the param-
eter μ, which is the drift of the firm-value process governing default, we 
observe estimates are increasing in seniority class, ranging from 9.6% 
to 18.6% from subordinated bonds to loans, respectively. These too are 
statistically significant across seniorities. The fact that we are observing 
different estimates of a single firm value process across seniorities is evi-
dence that models which attribute identical default risk across different 
instrument types are mispecified – in fact, we are measuring lower default 
risk (i.e., lower asset value volatility and greater drift in firm-value) in loans 
and senior secured bonds as compared to unsecured and subordinated 
bonds. A key finding concerns the magnitudes and composition of the 
components  of  recovery  volatility  across  maturities  inferred  from  the 
model calibration. The MLE point estimates of the parameter β, the sen-
sitivity of the recovery-rate process to the systematic factor governing 
default (or due to PD-side systematic risk), increases in seniority class, 
from 10.2% for subordinated bonds to 18.2% for senior bank loans. On 
the other hand, estimates of the parameter υ, the sensitivity of the recov-
ery-rate process to the systematic factor governing collateral value (or 
due to LGD-side systematic risk), are greater than β across seniorities, 
and similarly increases from 12.4% for subordinated bonds to 36.8% for 
bank loans. This monotonic increase in both β and υ as we move up in 
the hierarchy of the capital structure from lower to higher ranked instru-
ments has the interpretation of a greater sensitivity in the recovery rate 
process attributable to both systematic risks, implying that total recovery 
volatility sR = (β2 + υ2)1/2 increases from higher to lower ELGD instru-
ments, from 16.1% for subordinated bonds to 41.1% for senior loans. 
However, we see that the proportion of the total recovery volatility at-
tributable to systematic risk in collateral (firm) value, or the LGD (PD) 
side, is increasing (decreasing) in seniority from 59.3% to 80.5% (40.7% 
to 19.6%) from subordinated bonds to senior bank loans. Consequently, 
more senior instruments not only exhibit greater recovery volatility than 
less senior instruments, but a larger component of this volatility is driven 
by the collateral rather than the asset value process.
The next set of results concern the random drift in the recovery rate pro-
cess. The MLE point estimates of the parameter κa, the speed of the 
mean-reversion, is hump-shape in seniority class, ranging from 3.3% 
subordinated bonds, to 5.5% for senior unsecured bonds, to 4.0% for 
loans, respectively. Estimates of the parameter a, the long-run mean of 
the random drift in the recovery rate process, increases in seniority class 
from 18.8% for subordinated bonds to 37.1% for senior bank loans. This 
monotonic increase in a from lower to higher ranked instruments has the 
interpretation of greater expected return of the recovery rate process in-
ferred from lower ELGD (or greater expected recovery) instruments as we 
move up in the hierarchy of the capital structure. We see that the volatility 
of the random drift in the recovery rate process ηa, increases in seniority 
class, ranging from 18.7% for subordinated bonds to 48.9% for senior 
loans. The monotonic increase in ηa as we move from lower to higher 
ranked instruments has the interpretation of greater volatility in expected 
return of the recovery rate process inferred from lower ELGD (or greater 
expected recovery) instruments as we move up in the hierarchy of the 
capital structure. Finally, estimates of the parameter ζ, the correlation 
of the random processes in drift of and the level of the recovery rate 
process, increase in seniority class from 9.4% for subordinated bonds 
to 20.9% for senior bank loans. Finally with respect to parameter esti-
mates, regarding the MLE point estimates of the correlation between the 
default and recovery rate processes   , we observe that estimates are 
increasing in seniority class, ranging from 6.0% for subordinated bonds 
to 12.8% for senior loans.
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10  Estimates for the baseline Merton structural model (BMSM) and for the Merton structural 
model with stochastic drift (MSM-SD) are available upon request.40
We conclude this section by discussing the quality of the estimates and 
model performance measures. Across seniority classes, parameter es-
timates are all statistically significant, and the magnitudes of such es-
timates are in general distinguishable across segments at conventional 
significance levels. The likelihood ratio statistic indicates that we can 
reject the null hypothesis that all parameter estimates are equal to zero 
across all ELGD segments, a p-value of 4.7e-3. We also show various di-
agnostics that assess in-sample fit, which show that the model performs 
well-in sample. The area under receiver operating characteristic curve 
(AUROC) of 93.1% is high by commonly accepted standards, indicat-
ing a good ability of the model to discriminate between high and low 
LGD defaulted instruments. Another test of discriminatory ability of the 
models is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic, the very small p-value 
2.1e-8 indicating adequate separation in the distributions of the low and 
high LGD instruments in the model.11 We also show 2 tests of predictive 
accuracy, which is the ability of the model to accurately quantify a level 
of LGD. The McFadden psuedo r-squared (MPR2) is high by commonly 
accepted standards, 72.1%, indicating a high rank-order correlation be-
tween model and realized LGDs of defaulted instruments. Another test 
of predictive accuracy of the models is the Hoshmer-Lemeshow (HL) 
statistic, high p-values of 0.63 indicating high accuracy of the model to 
forecast cardinal LGD.
Downturn LGD
In this section we explore the implications of our model with respect to 
downturn LGD. This is a critical component of the quantification process 
in Basel II advanced IRB framework for regulatory capital. The Final Rule 
(FR) in the U.S. [OCC et al. (2007)] requires banks that either wish, or 
are required, to qualify for treatment under the advanced approach to 
estimate a downturn LGD. We paraphrase the FR, this is an LGD esti-
mated during an historical reference period during which default rates 
are elevated within an institution’s loan portfolio. In Figures 3 we plot 
the ratios of the downturn LGD to the expected LGD. This is derived by 
conditioning on the 99.9th quantile of the PD side systematic factor in the 
model for ultimate LGD. We show this for loans and bonds, as well as for 
different settings of key parameters (  , υ, or ηa) in the plot, with other 
parameters set to the MLE estimates. We observe that the LGD mark-up 
for downturn is montonically declining in ELGD, which is indicative of 
lower tail risk in recovery for lower ELGD instruments. It is also greater 
than unity in all cases, and approaches 1 as ELGD approaches 1. This 
multiple is higher for bonds than for loans, as well as for either higher 
PD-LGD correlation   or collateral specific volatility υ, although these 
differences narrow for higher ELGD.
Model validation
In this final section we validate our model, in particular, we implement 
an out-of-sample and out-of-time analysis, on a rolling annual cohort 
basis for the final 12 years of our sample. Furthermore, we augment 
this by resampling on both the training and prediction samples, a non-
parametric bootstrap [Efron (1979), Efron and Tibshirani (1986), Davison 
and Hinkley (1997)]. The procedure is as follows: the first training (or es-
timation) sample is established as the cohorts defaulting in the 10 years 
1987-1996, and the first prediction (or validation) sample is established 
as the 1997 cohort. Then we resample 100,000 times with replacement 
from the training sample the 1987-1996 cohorts and for the prediction 
sample 1997 cohort, and then based upon the fitted model in the former 
we evaluate the model based upon the latter. We then augment the train-
ing sample with the 1997 cohort, and establish the 1998 cohort as the 
prediction sample, and repeat this. This is continued until we have left the 
2008 cohort as the holdout. Finally, to form our final holdout sample, we 
pool all of our out-of-sample resampled prediction cohorts, the 12 years 
running from 1997 to 2008. We then analyze the distributional properties 
(such as median, dispersion, and shape) of the two key diagnostic sta-
tistics: the Spearman rank-order correlation for discriminatory (or clas-
sification) accuracy, and the Hoshmer-Lemeshow chi-squared P-values 
for predictive accuracy, or calibration.
Before  discussing  the  results,  we  briefly  describe  the  two  alternative 
frameworks for predicting ultimate LGD that are to be compared to the 
2-factor  structural  model  with  systematic  recovery  and  random  drift 
(2FSM-SR&RD) developed in this paper. First, we implement a full-in-
formation maximum likelihood simultaneous equation regression model 
(FIMLE-SERM) for ultimate LGD, which is an econometric model built 
















Figure 3 – Ratio of ultimate downturn to expected LGD versus ELGD at 
99.9th percentile of PD-side systematic factor Z
11  In these tests we take the median LGD to be the cut-off that distinguishes between a high 
and low realized LGD.41
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upon observations in MURD at both the instrument and obligor level. 
FIMLE is used to model the endogeneity of the relationship between LGD 
at the firm and instrument levels in an internally consistent manner. This 
technique enables us to build a model that can help us understand some 
of the structural determinants of LGD, and potentially improve our fore-
casts of LGD. This model contains 199 observations from the MURD™ 
with variables: long term debt to market value of equity, book value of as-
sets quantile, intangibles to book value of assets, interest coverage ratio, 
free cash flow to book value of assets, net income to net sales, number 
of major creditor classes, percentage of secured debt, Altman Z-Score, 
debt vintage (time since issued), Moody’s 12 month trailing speculative 
grade default rate, industry dummy, filing district dummy, and a pre-
packaged bankruptcy dummy. Detailed discussion of the results can be 
found in Jacobs and Karagozoglu (2010). The second alternative model 
we consider addresses the problem of non-parametrically estimating a 
regression relationship, in which there are several independent variables 
and in which the dependent variable is bounded, as an application to 
the distribution of LGD. Standard non-parametric estimators of unknown 
probability distribution functions, whether conditional or not, utilize the 
Gaussian kernel [Silverman (1982), Hardle and Linton (1994), and Pagan 
and Ullah (1999)]. It is well known that there exists a boundary bias with a 
Gaussian kernel, which assigns non-zero density outside the support on 
the dependent variable, when smoothing near the boundary. Chen (1999) 
has proposed a beta kernel density estimator (BKDE) defined on the unit 
interval [0,1], having the appealing properties of flexible functional form, a 
bounded support, simplicity of estimation, non-negativity, and an optimal 
rate of convergence n-4/5 in finite samples. Furthermore, even if the true 
density is unbounded at the boundaries, the BKDE remains consistent 
[Bouezmarni and Rolin (2001)], which is important in the context of LGD, 
as there are point masses (observation clustered at 0% and 100%) in 
empirical applications. Detailed derivation of this model can be found 
in Jacobs and Karagozoglu (2010). We extend the BKDE [Renault and 
Scalliet (2004)] to a generalized beta kernel conditional density estimator 
(GBKDE), in which the density is a function of several independent vari-
ables, which affect the smoothing through the dependency of the beta 
distribution parameters upon these variables.
Results of the model validation are shown in Table 3. We see that while all 
models perform decently out–of-sample in terms of rank ordering capa-
bility, FIMLE-SEM performs the best (median = 83.2%), the GBKDE the 
worst (median = 72.0%), and our 2FSM-SR&RD in the middle (median = 
79.1%). It is also evident from the Table and figures that the better per-
forming models are also less dispersed and exhibit less multi-modality. 
However, the structural model is closer in performance to the regression 
model by the distribution of the Pearson correlation, and indeed there 
is a lot of overlap in these. Unfortunately, the out-of-sample predictive 
accuracy is not as encouraging for any of the models, as in a sizable 
proportion of the runs we can reject adequacy of fit (i.e., p-values indi-
cating rejection of the null of model it at conventional levels). The rank 
ordering of model performance for Hoshmer-Lemeshow p-values of test 
statistics is the same as for the Pearson statistics: FIMLE-SEM performs 
the best (median = 24.8%), the GBKDE the worst (median = 13.2%), and 
our 2FSM-SR&RD in the middle (median = 23.9%); and the structural 
model developed herein is comparable in out-of-sample predictive ac-
curacy to the high-dimensional regression model. We conclude that while 
all models are challenged in predicting cardinal levels of ultimate LGD 
out-of-sample, it is remarkable that a relatively parsimonious structural 
model of ultimate LGD can perform so closely to a highly parameterized 
econometric model.
Conclusions and directions for future research
In this study we have developed a theoretical model for ultimate loss-giv-
en-default, having many intuitive and realistic features, in the structural 
credit risk modeling framework. Our extension admits differential senior-
ity within the capital structure, an independent process representing a 
source of undiversifiable recovery risk with a stochastic drift, and an op-
timal foreclosure threshold. We also analyzed the comparative statics of 
this model. In the empirical analysis we calibrated the model for ultimate 
Test 
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Median 0.7198 0.7910 0.8316
Standard deviation 0.1995 0.1170 0.1054
5th percentile 0.4206 0.5136 0.5803






Median 0.1318 0.2385 0.2482
Standard deviation 0.0720 0.0428 0.0338
5th percentile 0.0159 0.0386 0.0408
95th percentile 0.2941 0.5547 0.5784
1 –   In each run, observations are sampled randomly with replacement from the training and 
prediction samples, the model is estimated in the training sample and observations are 
classified in the prediction period, and this is repeated 100,000 times.
2 –   The correlation between the ranks of the predicted and realizations, a measure of the 
discriminatory accuracy of the model.
3 –   A normalized average deviation between empirical frequencies and average modeled 
probabilities across deciles of risk, ranked according to modeled probabilities, a 
measure of model fit or predictive accuracy of the model.
4 – Generalized beta kernel conditional density estimator model.
5 – Two factor structural Merton systematic recovery and random drift model.
6 –   Full-information maximum likelihood simultaneous equation regression model. 199 
observations with variables: long term debt to market value of equity, book value of 
assets quantile, intangibles to book value of assets, interest coverage ratio, free cash 
flow to book value of assets, net income to net sales, number of major creditor classes, 
percent secured debt, Altman Z-Score, debt vintage (time since issued), Moody’s 12 
month trailing speculative grade default rate, industry dummy, filing district dummy and 
prepackaged bankruptcy dummy.
Table 3 – Bootstrapped1 out-of-sample and out-of-time classification and 
predictive accuracy model comparison analysis of alternative models for 
ultimate loss-given-default (Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database 1987-
2009)42
LGD on bonds and loans, having both trading prices at default and at res-
olution of default, utilizing an extensive sample of agency rated defaulted 
firms in the Moody’s URD™. These 800 defaults are largely representative 
of the U.S. large corporate loss experience, for which we have the com-
plete capital structures, and can track the recoveries on all instruments 
to the time of default to the time of resolution. We demonstrated that 
parameter estimates vary significantly across recovery segments, finding 
that the estimated volatilities of the recovery rate processes and their 
random drifts are increasing in seniority; in particular, for 1st lien bank 
loans as compared to senior secured or unsecured bonds. Furthermore, 
we found that the proportion of recovery volatility attributable to the LGD-
side (as opposed to the PD-side) systematic factors to be higher for more 
senior instruments. We argued that this reflects the inherently greater risk 
in the ultimate recovery for higher ranked instruments having lower ex-
pected loss severities. In an exercise highly relevant to requirements for 
the quantification of a downturn LGD for advanced IRB under Basel II, we 
analyzed the implications of our model for this purpose, finding the later 
to be declining for higher expected LGD, higher for lower ranked instru-
ments, and increasing in the correlation between the process driving firm 
default and recovery on collateral. Finally, we validated our model in an 
out-of-sample bootstrapping exercise, comparing it to two alternatives, 
a high-dimensional regression model and a non-parametric benchmark, 
both based upon the same MURD data. We found our model to compare 
favorably in this exercise. We conclude that our model is worthy of con-
sideration to risk managers, as well as supervisors concerned with ad-
vanced IRB under the Basel II capital accord. It can be a valuable bench-
mark for internally developed models for ultimate LGD, as this model can 
be calibrated to LGD observed at default (either market prices or model 
forecasts, if defaulted instruments are non-marketable) and to ultimate 
LGD measured from workout recoveries. Finally, risk managers can use 
our model as an input into internal credit capital models.
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